

## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <a href="http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content">http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content</a>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY—STATUTES—PARTIAL INVALIDITY.—An action was brought under a statute authorizing a suit to restrain the use for advertising purposes of a person's picture and for damages, unless the written consent of such person had been first obtained. The defendant raised the question of the constitutionality of the act. *Held*, that the statute is valid so far as it regulates the right to use the picture of another, though it should be conceded that a section of the same law making such act a misdemeanor is invalid. *Wyatt* v. *James McCreary Co.* (1908), 111 N. Y. Supp. 86.

This case marks one more step in the development of that comparatively new branch of the law which has become known in legal phraseology as the Right to Privacy. The subject may be found treated at length in 3 Mich. L. Rev. 559, and also in 4 HARV. L. Rev. 193. Cases in which the precise question have been decided are not many and date back not earlier than 1890. The leading case is Roberson v. Rochester F. B. Co. et al., 171 N. Y. 539, 64 N. E. 442, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828, decided in 1902, in which the Court of Appeals of New York, by a vote of four to three, denied the existence in law of any inherent right to privacy, but modified the effect of the holding by suggesting that such a right might arise through legislative enactment. In response to the suggestion, the legislature the following year passed the statute in question in the principal case, and which is for the first time submitted for judicial interpretation. The defendant contended that the enactment was a violation of the constitutional provision forbidding the passing of any statute depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law and forbidding any state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws. The court cast no doubt, however, on the "right of the legislature to give to an individual the right to apply to a court of equity for protection from an unauthorized act which, although not involving injury to property, is yet calculated to produce mental distress." Though not directly raised in the case, the court indicates that a section of the statute making such unwarranted use of another's picture a misdemeanor is invalid, as an unconstitutional exercise of police power.

Schools and School Districts—Pupils—Health Regulations—Vaccination.—P. by her next friend filed her petition in the name of the people and therein alleged that she had been denied admission to the public schools of Chicago by the Board of Education because she refused to be vaccinated, and prayed for a mandamus commanding the Board to admit her. The Board, in justification of the exclusion, set up an ordinance of the City of Chicago requiring the exclusion of any child who shall not have been vaccinated within seven years next preceding the application for admission. On appeal from an order overruling petitioner's demurrer, held, the ordinance is unreasonable and void. People ex rel Jenkins v. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1908), — Ill. —, 84 N. E. 1046.

Ordinances and statutes similar to this one have for many years been a fruitful source of litigation. It has been generally held that where the legislature has prescribed vaccination as a condition to the enjoyment of the legal right to attend public schools, such regulation is valid. Abeel v. Clark,